As the 20 th century drew to a close, Colombia appeared destined for utter collapse, the victim of more than three decades of insurgent warfare, beset by powerful right-wing paramilitaries, and overrun by illicit drug production and smuggling. wartime command of 20,000 fighting men. 2 In Vietnam, however, the communist insurgents refused to be drawn into open combat. Hunting the furtive enemy in the jungles was akin to using a "pile driver trying to crush a fly." 3 Trinquier understood the insurgent, his style of warfare, and he offers suggestions for successful counterinsurgency. He recognized that, from the insurgents' viewpoint, the insurgency must manipulate the population to support the insurgent and his cause, and rally other opposition groups against the government in charge. 4 The insurgent draws strength from the terrain he inhabits. The local population provides logistics and intelligence support. The insurgent will select a battlefield that provides an asymmetric advantage, one that minimizes or altogether prevents government forces from using modern transportation and aircraft support, stripping the modern force of their clearest advantage in the field. Removed from the land he knows so well, the insurgent will be exposed as a mediocre fighter at best. 5 Accordingly, Triquier dictated three principles of counterinsurgency: (1) isolate the insurgent from the population that sustains him, (2) drive the guerrillas from their territory, and finally (3) hold a large area for a long time. 6 His methods, Triquier suggested, would "never achieve spectacular results," but would eventually bring victory over an insurgency. communists would use any grievance (such as corruption or lack of services) as leverage against the government. If they seize control, they reduce taxes to curry favor among the population. 9 Taking control of safe sanctuary areas, the guerrilla will then attack military and police outposts to seize weapons, gain prestige, and undermine confidence in the government. Covert cells in the community provide recruits, logistics, and intelligence support to the communists' local armed units and larger, mobile units. 10 The armed units remain dispersed in rough and inaccessible terrain, concentrating only to initiate an attack. If they encounter government forces, the guerrillas break contact and melt away into their protective terrain features. Guerrilla victories further undermine popular confidence in the government and bolster support for the insurgency. The insurgents quickly recruit to reconstitute any losses.
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As Mao suggested, "the guerrilla must be to the population as little fishes in water." 12 Thompson recognized that one could be both "a peasant be day and a guerrilla by night." 13 When government troops enter suspect villages, find nothing, and get no help, if their mounting frustration results in rash action, the insurgents will capitalize on the propaganda opportunity. Therefore, "by creating more communists than they kill, (they) become in effect communist recruiting drives." 14 Recognizing that insurgent warfare targets public confidence, Thompson focuses on these motivational issues.
When guerrillas evade a government operation, but the government claims victory nonetheless, the troops are dismayed, guerrillas encouraged, and recruiting numbers climb as the population increasingly believes the insurgents words, promises, and cause instead of the government. Low-level insurgent warfare continues escalating, gaining power largely by seizing weapons until the guerrillas can initiate a war of movement or until the government decides to negotiate a peace. 15 Thompson dictated COIN strategy against communist guerrillas. First, the besieged government must "have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent, and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable."
The government must also address what the communists label societal "contradictions,"
such as corruption. Second, the government must operate within the law, specifically noting that "detention is perhaps one of the most controversial powers which a government may exercise." Third, "government must have an overall plan" to address not only security but also "political, social, economic, administrative, police and other measures." Fourth, the government must prioritize "defeating the political subversion, not the guerrilla." Finally, during an insurgency's guerrilla phase, a "government must secure its base areas first;" the reverse is true during the initial phase when the government should counter with security and economic measures in remote areas. 16 In addition to his clear view of insurgency and concise methodology for counterinsurgency, Thompson offers several guidelines from his experience. In a strategy paraphrased as, "Clear, Hold, Winning, Won;" 17 Thompson suggests "clearing"
insurgents from an area is likely counterproductive unless the government has the means and will to "hold" that area, restoring government authority and instilling security. 18 "Winning" is a matter of good governance, with consideration for health, education, "improved livelihood and standard of living," and improved transportation infrastructure. 19 Since insurgency is largely fueled by a population's discontent, military discipline is critical. Thompson noted that the Vietnamese army failed in the "vital aspect" of "good, strict disciplined behavior toward its own population." 20 Regarding amnesty, it should not be offered too soon, since the terms can be released later but are difficult to retract once publicly acknowledged. 21 Additionally, when granting amnesty, government forces should avoid using terms such as "surrender" and "prisoner of war," since these terms are pejorative and will make the former insurgent feel deceived. 27 The orthodox insurgency begins with establishing a political party and uniting with like-minded allies, even those whose divergent ideology will require their separation later. 28 Galula defines these first two phases as the "cold revolution," because although the insurgents' ideology and formation are established, the actual fighting has not yet begun. 29 The insurgent movement then begins guerrilla warfare, steadily building strength until capable of movement warfare and, finally, an annihilation campaign to overthrow the government. 30 These three phases together constitute, the "hot revolution." 31 Switching to the government perspective, Galula describes four COIN courses of action, all or any combination of which may be employed. The government may choose direct action against the insurgency, indirect action influencing the population, infiltrating the insurgency, or "strengthening the political machine." 32 Galula describes these courses of action with varying degrees of detail. In (1) acting directly against the insurgent leadership, the action must be strictly legal or it risks encouraging the insurgency's cause. Any legal trial will catapult the clash of ideologies to the national stage. He suggests that this approach works especially well if the insurgents' cause has little popular appeal and the government can prevent the insurgents' access to publicity. 33 Next, the government may (2) act indirectly by addressing those conditions which initially bred the insurgency, usually by conducting judicial reform, augmenting policing efforts, streamlining and focusing the government bureaucracy on the country's basic problems. 34 Galula suggests (3) infiltrating the insurgency and bringing about its destruction from within is quite possible with a relatively newly-formed insurgency. However, he cautions that infiltration operations become increasingly difficult as the movement matures. 35 Finally, he suggests (4) strengthening the political machine itself. Galula explicitly refuses to explain this beyond vaguely suggesting that the "peacetime political machine is built essentially on patronage." 36 Galula's strategic discussion of insurgency and COIN methods are clear and relatively concise, but he offers few new specific details regarding COIN tactics, techniques, and procedures. In stark contrast to Trinquier, Galula demands that prisoners must be treated well, as he himself was when captured by the communist Chinese. 37 In contrast, the nationalist Chinese so distrusted the communists that 5,000 nationalist prisoners, released by the communist insurgents were then sequestered in a camp to prevent them from "contaminating" the army. 38 When captured and briefly held by communist Chinese insurgents, Galula accepted and published their stated aims without apparent question or comment, 39 calling his own objectivity into question. 40 Galula suggested a light and highly adaptive military for COIN warfare, and suggested that the military itself would often become the instrument of government support in the field, providing medical services and administering governance in recently-captured insurgent areas. 41 His suggestion to administer a census and issue identification cards within former insurgent areas 42 Trinquier also first advocated and Thompson supported the heavy-handed "strategic hamlet" concept whereby civilian populations in insurgent-dominated areas were forcefully relocated and carefully monitored to isolate the guerrilla's from their popular support. 48 Trinquier directed that everyone in the hamlet should be interrogated to identify suspect insurgents; these suspects were subjected to "more stringent interrogation" to identify still more insurgents and their structure. 49 He advocated supporting these strategic hamlets with "practical projects," such as road construction and repair, education projects, and encouraging economic development. 50 than three decades later. He wrote that the countryside, especially mountainous terrain, allowed little protection for the legitimate population. Here the insurgent could carry out "a few brutalities, such as savagely executed preventative assassinations," to encourage the population to provide authorities with no useful data, while surreptitiously supporting the insurgents. 55 Trinquier noted that timid police patrols often fell to the insurgent cause, further fueling the insurgents' political momentum. Eventually, "immense zones" will be abandoned to the guerrillas, allowing them free reign. 56 This is exactly the case with the FARC.
Although these classics of COIN literature remain useful for study and guidance, they must be studied critically for their continued application to modern insurgencies as four decades have passed since Trinquier, Thompson, and Galula set pens to paper. In the 1980s, the FARC turned to the burgeoning drug trade to finance its operations. 73 Against the rising, drug-fueled, leftist tide, the first of 130 right-wing paramilitary organizations formed in 1987. Originally funded by cattle and farming interests, they, too, used drugs as a major source of income. 74 The paramilitaries became infamous for killing civilians they believed supported left-wing guerrillas. 75 86 In an attempt to initiate negotiations, President Pastrana responded to a FARC request by ceding one third of the country to their control in a demilitarized zone, the despeje, in 1999, 87 but the FARC refused to engage in peace talks. 88 Hostage-taking for profit and political gain reached its peak in 2000 with over 3,500 captured. 89 The drug smugglers enjoyed sufficient autonomy to begin constructing a large, welded steel, submarine on the outskirts of Bogota capable of carrying hundreds of tons of cocaine. 90 The various insurgent movements active in Colombia were winning. In 1996, the ELN boasted 3,000 fighters who largely financed their operations through extortion. 91 Since 1977, the FARC had definitively and consistently beaten the Colombian government forces in the field. 92 Between 1999 and 2001, the number of armed FARC forces reached a new zenith of 17,000 fighters. 93 The FARC guerrillas graduated to mobile warfare, using large columns of guerrilla fighters, crew-served weapons, and artillery. 94 As the 20 th century drew to a close, Colombia was headed toward utter collapse, victim of more than three decades of insurgent warfare, beset by powerful 121 The old system required five years to bring a case to trial and yielded convictions only 60 percent of all cases. The new system averages only one year to bring a case to trial with an 80 percent conviction rate. 122 To relieve the court system of backlogged, lesser complaints, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) created 45 "justice houses" whose trained conciliators managed over seven million cases. USAID also trained 1,600 public defenders. The "drug war" has not reduced trafficking despite cracking the cartels, extraditing hundreds of drug producers and smugglers to the US, and spraying coca fields for years. Colombia still exports more cocaine than any country in the world, even more than before Plan Colombia was enacted. 133 Due to higher crop yields, the United Fifth, strengthen the population's loyalty for the country. Insurgency threatens the entire country and demands a broad response; it is not simply a military problem. 149 Uribe found employment opportunities for the poor and applied taxes to the rich. His weekly press events throughout the country demonstrate (1) a personal concern for the voters, and (2) his personal confidence in restored security. Thompson suggested that a properly functioning information service will "emphasize the government's legality, construction, and results in juxtaposition with the insurgents' illegality, destruction, and promises." 150 In Colombia, this juxtaposition is witnessed daily, in many ways.
Sixth, offer the insurgent options. GEN Ospina cautions readers to remember that the guerrilla enemy is also a "fellow citizen. Colombia's Road Ahead Despite Colombia's many remarkable improvements during Uribe's leadership, his convivir connections to right-wing paramilitaries and the human rights violations they conducted continue to raise questions, both in the press and in the US Congress.
Hanson and Romero's criticism is typical. They note a peace activist's assassination by "unknown assailants" after release from government detention and continued paramilitary violence long after a declared ceasefire. 153 164 Large, rurally poor, and until recently poorly administered Colombia has largely overcome these disadvantages, demonstrating that a firm, visionary leadership wielding the full spectrum of national power can overcome long odds in COIN. For the Colombia-US coalition, the coin has been tossed, the toss is near to being declared a victory. It now remains for the US to retract our hand slowly enough to not drop the COIN, and Colombia, back into chaos.
Recommendations
The US-Colombia coalition significantly restored Colombia as a stable, secure democracy. The hard-won lessons from this protracted war, together with the enduring lessons from COIN literature, provide valuable guidance for US prosecution of other coalition COIN wars.
Strategy is important enough to require periodic review and, if necessary, revision. The desired end-state from the initial plan may be incomplete or incorrect.
The US population must understand the valid military maxim, "no plan survives the first engagement." The US-Colombia coalition Plan Colombia is no exception; years of engagement produced huge but qualified successes. In failing to admit or recognize these successes, US politicians undermine the relationship with the strongest ally in South America. A myopic focus on continued drug production and smuggling serves partisan political goals sufficiently to negate any interest in the greater context.
Colombia's many measureable gains, therefore, are often overshadowed by an inability to reduce illegal drug production and trafficking. Military leaders should avoid defining and end-state so narrowly that other successes will not register with the public or with Congressional leaders.
Redefining strategy and goals is not, necessarily, an admission of failure.
Strategy should be carefully and routinely re-evaluated. Reducing drug production and smuggling alone is an inadequate measure by which to gauge US-Colombian success, and masks the greater Measures of effectiveness require periodic review and correction. Thompson recognized that tracking the enemy kill rate was ineffective; instead, he advocated tracking the number of weapons seized from and lost to the enemy. 165 Colombia's general staff also rejected a body count mentality, refocusing instead on targeting FARC leadership. This emphasis brought about the first military success against the FARC Secretariat in four decades, negated the public perception of their invulnerability, helped turn the public opinion tide, and hastened their decline.
The center of gravity for any insurgency is the population itself. From the several books reviewed here, Thompson best described the fine balance between prosecuting military operations against the enemy while maintaining positive relations with the population at large. Humanitarian assistance, civil support, security, and reconstruction operations all undermine the popular discontent on which an insurgency feeds. These operations, often considered secondary, must stand on par with combat operations.
Combat can pluck the weed, but good governance is the necessary gardening to prevent its return.
Joint operations are only the beginning; the entire DIMEFIL spectrum of national power must be brought to bear. Coordinated, effective joint operations sharpen the military spear, but military operations alone will not maintain the peace. In Colombia, military leadership helps direct the Coordination Center for Integrated Government Action (CCAI), focusing national education, health, economic and public works efforts to address public discontent and restore or establish loyalty to the federal governmenteffectively isolating the FARC.
We can do much to elevate an ally's standing in the world by merely appreciating and capitalizing on their success. The US does not hold exclusive rights to good ideas in the war against terrorism or against insurgents. Colombian police have trained Afghan police on counter-drug operations. US commanders should look to experienced allies like the Colombians for their hard-won COIN experience.
Advocating torture caused France to lose the peace in Algeria after winning the war; it cost Trinquier his honor. US commanders should take note. The populations' hearts and minds are to be won, not broken.
A graduated amnesty system linked with a timely and transparent legal system help resolve conflict, expose other underlying crimes, and restore the social fabric of a divided society. Sadly it took Colombia two attempts to learn this lesson. President
Turbay's 1981 amnesty offer to the FARC brought a rare peace and a move toward reintegration. War quickly reignited when the FARC's political candidate was assassinated. 166 With the current demobilization active, violence is again declining, but
1981 taught that such progress can be quickly reversed.
Conclusion
Insurgency threatens many nations throughout the globe. When US national interests dictate, the US will engage, often working to establish a stable and secure democracy and deny terrorists a safe haven. Colombia has 40 years of experience fighting a protracted and difficult COIN war. The US has 10 years of shared experience in this fight. Together, we have every right to be proud of the many successes won, while focusing on Colombia's remaining problems. We should use our experience to inform our actions in other theaters. We should recognize that our allies, like Colombia, have much they can teach us regarding the full employment of national power to defeat an insurgency and restore stability and democracy. 4 Ibid., 6. 5 Ibid., 52-53. 6 Ibid., 54.
